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Introduction
I have just completed a book on the genesis of the European Convention on
Human Rights, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis
of the European Convention.' The book is concerned primarily with the
t Professor Simpson delivered this paper as the first Carlos Caceres Memorial
Lecture. Caceres, '91, died in 2000 while working for the United Nations in Indonesia,
and so gave to the world all at his command.
* Charles F. and Edith J. Clyne Professor of Law University of Michigan Law
School. M.A., Doctorate of Civil Law, Oxford University.
1. A.W. BRIAN' SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE
GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (2001). This paper is a byproduct of that book,
which has now been published by the Oxford University Press. It is based on the pub-
lished material and on various collections of archives: British archives, mainly those of
the Cabinet Office, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office, U.S. National Archives,
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period 1945-1966, it being in 1966 that the British government accepted
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and the right of
individual petition, both of which were optional under the convention as
signed in 1950. The negotiation of such a convention is primarily an
aspect of the conduct of foreign policy, hence the negotiations need to be
located in the general history of British foreign policy of the postwar
period. Britain was, at this time, a major colonial power, and the negotia-
tions were also much affected by this fact and by the climate of anticoloni-
alism which found a platform in the United Nations. Indeed, the
convention first began to have practical significance in relation to British
colonies and their government when Greece began proceedings against the
U.K. over the insurrection in Cyprus and the measures taken by the U.K. to
suppress it.
The ratification of an international human rights instrument capable
of having domestic effect, either at home or in dependencies, is bound to
cause difficulties and embarrassment to government. The whole purpose
of human rights law is to restrict the powers of government over its own
citizens or subjects. At the conclusion of the Second World War there were
three major powers, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and the U.K., which all actively
participated in the human rights movement, initially solely in the United
Nations. In the period between the end of the war and the collapse of the
Soviet bloc only the U.K. ended up as a party to a general human rights
convention capable of having significant domestic effects-the European
Convention. How and why did the U.K. come to negotiate and ratify this
convention and, after long delay, accept the jurisdiction of the court and
the right of individual petition? More generally, why did other European
powers, some with much reluctance, do the same? More radically, why did
the idea of the general international protection of human rights evolve dur-
ing the Second World War, and what is the relationship between the
human rights movement's first major expression, the Universal Declaration
of 1948, and the European Convention? These are the questions I hope to
raise for discussion.
I. The Three Major Powers
The movement for the international protection of human rights, though it
has pre-war antecedents, is a product of the Second World War. When the
war ended there were three major world powers: the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R.,
and the U.K. The scheme embodied in the UN Charter assumed that they,
together with China (which was not a world power, but which was
included on the insistence of President Roosevelt), would cooperate and
exercise a leadership role in the brave new world. This system has been
labeled "Four Power Management."
the records of the European Movement, the records of the United Nations, and various
other collections of papers. The book provides fuller documentation than is possible in
this paper.
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Of the three states, the U.S.A. was far and away the most powerful.
The U.S.S.R. had been devastated by war, but retained an extremely power-
ful military. The U.K. was nearly bankrupt and had commitments out of
proportion to its resources, although it was not until sometime after the
war that the extent of its disastrous consequences on the U.K. became
apparent. So there were, in 1945, three super powers.
The U.S.A. and the U.K. were liberal democracies, but the U.K. dif-
fered radically from the U.S.A. in being, straightforwardly, a colonial
power. Nearly all of its colonial dependencies enjoyed some measure of
domestic self-government, but in general had made very limited progress
towards eventual independence as democratic self-governing states. The
dismantling of the British colonial empire, to be largely complete by 1966,
had, in 1945, not yet begun. The first major step in the process of
decolonization was Indian independence in 1947. For some other territo-
ries, for example Burma and Ceylon, independence came at about the same
time. For others, such as Nigeria, independence was, in 1945, thought to
lie far in the future.
The U.S.A. did not, in 1945, possess a significant colonial empire.
Like the U.S.S.R. it sought to establish satellite states and areas of the world
in which it exercised predominant influence, for example the Pacific, with
power bolstered by the acquisition of overseas bases. Both the U.S.A. and
the U.S.S.R. had, within their borders, minority groups of peoples who were
in one way or another treated as outsiders. For example African and Native
Americans in the U.S.A. and the Crimean Tatars in the U.S.S.R. The offi-
cial U.S. position was that there were no minorities in the U.S.A.; the
U.S.S.R. was proud of its minority policy, described by an unsympathetic
British Foreign Office official as "folk-dancing punctuated by deporta-
tions." All three superpowers had human rights skeletons in their cup-
boards, but those in the cupboard of the U.S.S.R. were far and away the
most grisly.
In the period immediately after the establishment of the UN in 1945
all three powers participated actively in the human rights movement at the
United Nations, through the Human Rights Commission (HRC), the Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the General Assembly and its
Third Committee. All claimed to be enthusiastic champions of human
rights. Somewhat inconsistently, they exhibited considerable nervousness
over the possibility that some scheme of human rights, supported by some
institutionalized system for investigating and taking action over alleged vio-
lations, should apply to themselves. They subscribed, to varying degrees,
to the notion that human rights protection is primarily an aspect of the
export trade, designed to bring "lesser breeds without the law" up to civi-
lized standards. States are not, of course, monolithic, and there were
clashes of view, for example, within the U.S. State Department. Some
actors favored strong protection, even if this applied domestically, whilst
others did not.
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II. Going Their Separate Ways
The policy of the three superpowers in relation to human rights protection
developed along different lines.
A. The U.S.S.R.
After some initial fumbling, the U.S.S.R. took the line firstly, that civil and
political rights, the darlings of the West, were not of primary importance
and secondly, that any form of international supervision of what went on
in the U.S.S.R. was both unnecessary and improper. It represented an ille-
gitimate interference in matters of purely domestic concern. Quite recently
Russian policy has changed, and the Russian Federation has now signed
up to the European Convention on Human Rights. But strong resistance to
interference with domestic matters under the banner of human rights long
continued to be the message from Moscow. The Soviets, however, were
quite ready to employ appeals to human rights in critical attacks on the
conduct of other States. The essentially negative Soviet attitude is strik-
ingly illustrated by the failure of the Soviet bloc to vote for the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in December 1948. There were eight absten-
tions: the U.S.S.R, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia,
Ukraine, South Africa, and Yugoslavia. The Declaration was generally then
thought to impose no international obligations, and it established no form
of institutionalized international supervision. Yet the Soviets would not
vote for it.
However, the U.S.S.R., in spite of its negative attitude, continued to be
involved in the tedious negotiations that eventually, in 1966, produced
texts of the two basic UN human rights covenants. It also sought to exer-
cise a leadership role in the anti-colonial movement. Opposition to colo-
nial rule, though in reality having little to do with the idea that government
should be limited by individual rights, could be expressed in terms of the
denial of the right of self-determination.
B. The U.S.A.
The U.S.A., by contrast, adopted under the Truman administration a very
positive attitude. Eleanor Roosevelt took the chair at the meetings of the
Human Rights Commission, which was engaged from 1947 onwards in
drafting an International Bill of Rights. As we shall see, it was not initially
settled what form this would take. Her appointment by President Truman
as U.S. Representative to the General Assembly and to the Commission of
Human Rights signaled a serious commitment by the U.S. administration
to the work of the new organization generally, and to its human rights work
in particular. She enjoyed what Humphrey, head of the human rights sec-
retariat, described as "enormous" prestige with the Russians, and indeed
with many Europeans. Within the U.S.A. she was highly regarded by those
of a liberal or mildly left wing persuasion. To those of the right she was
viewed with intense hostility as little better than a communist.
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She was a government nominee, not an independent expert, and this,
together with her lack of technical expertise, inevitably meant that she was
very much under the influence of her advisers from the State Department.
Considerable friction was caused by the fact that she relied on the advice of
the State Department officials, rather than the advice provided by the UN
Secretariat, in the conduct of business. Material now available from the
State Department Records in the U.S. National Archives makes it clear that
she was expected to act on instructions produced by the State Department,
and that she played little part in settling these instructions. Her dual role
as both Chair of the Human Rights Commission and delegate of the most
powerful state involved caused considerable difficulty. The problematic
aspects of her chairmanship were offset by the warmth of her personality,
her friendliness to her colleagues outside the meetings, and her
unbounded enthusiasm for getting the job done quickly.
With respect to the Universal Declaration was concerned, she suc-
ceeded in that a text was accepted in 1948 (though not in 1947, her origi-
nal aim). Her contribution to the UDHR in its final form has been
overplayed. Much of the credit, so far as chairmanship is concerned, is due
to Charles Malik, who represented Lebanon at San Francisco and who
chaired the critical meetings of the Third Committee of the Assembly. He
contrived to so control this unruly body as to produce a reasonably well-
drafted text; loquacious members were controlled by stopwatch. Much
credit must also go to the officials of the State Department, of the Foreign
Office (FO), and of India-and, in particular, Mrs. Hansa Mehta-whose
collaboration made Malik's task possible. Mrs. Roosevelt appears to have
played no part at all in the actual work of drafting. She enjoyed no success
with drafting the Covenants and by 1951 had no desire to continue to chair
the HRC. Long before this she had become disillusioned; a memorandum
she wrote in 1950 set out her views:
My own feeling is that the Near East, India, and many of the Asiatic peoples
have a profound distrust of white people. This is understandable since the
white people they have known intimately in the past have been the colonial
nations and, in the case of the United States, our business people. Their
areas of the world have been largely visited for purposes of exploitation.
2
She also drew attention to the race problem in the U.S.A., and to the
suspicions of Latin American countries. The consequence was that in the
Third Committee of the General Assembly:
there has been a constant attitude among a great bloc of these countries to
oppose everything the United States suggested. The mere fact that we spoke
for something would be enough to make them suspicious.... They are
joined by the whole Soviet bloc and while I am not sure they are fooled by
the Soviets, they are glad to have their votes.
3
2. NA, Dep't of State RG 59 340.1 AG 4-350 Box 1327. Letter of 14.12.50 E.
Roosevelt to Secretary of State.
3. Id.
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So it was that she came to think of the U.S.A. as beleaguered by an
unholy alliance between the anti-colonial group and the Soviets, much
indeed as did the British at this period. During the period when she
chaired the HRC she appears to have come to the view that it was
supremely important, if a covenant was ever produced, that it would be one
acceptable to the U.S. Congress.
The U.S.A., with its long tradition of individual rights protection under
the Constitution, was certainly well placed to exercise leadership in the
human rights movement. But there developed considerable domestic oppo-
sition to involvement in the human rights movement, opposition in part
connected with the nature of U.S. federalism. When the Eisenhower
administration assumed power U.S. policy changed. It was made clear that
the U.S.A. was not going to sign up to any international human rights cove-
nant produced by the UN. The U.S.A., like the U.S.S.R., nevertheless con-
tinued to be involved in the negotiations.
Since then U.S. policy has changed. The position now is the U.S.A. is
only prepared to become a party to international human rights covenants
subject to a set of reservations and interpretative understandings that
ensure that the covenant has, for all practical purposes, no domestic effect.
The explanations for this change in policy and the history of the matter are
complicated, and I only briefly mention some aspects in what follows. The
policy is that human rights are for export. The change of policy by the
Eisenhower administration inevitably damaged the U.S. position as a prin-
cipal champion of the international protection of human rights. This con-
tinues to be the situation.
C. The U.K.
The history of U.K. involvement in the human rights movement is strik-
ingly different from that of either Russia (until very recent times) or the
U.S.A. Like the U.S.A., it participated enthusiastically in the UN negotia-
tions from 1947 onwards, and continued, in a somewhat grudging way
after 1951, to involve itself in the negotiation of the two covenants, which it
eventually signed. Its potential role as a principal protagonist of human
rights in the UN was severely weakened by its position as a colonial power.
As the anti-colonial movement gathered strength it became increasingly
beleaguered in the General Assembly and other organs of the UN. Further-
more, and quite independently of the colonial issue, British diplomats and
politicians became deeply disillusioned with the UN. The assumptions on
which this world organization had been based-in particular continued
cooperation between the wartime allies-had proved to be false. Even
cooperation between the U.K. and the U.S.A. faltered, and by late 1947 all
hope of getting along with the Russians had been abandoned.
Britain's assumed role as a champion of human rights came to be
chiefly exercised at a regional level. The most important step the U.K. took
was to sign and ratify the European Convention (ECHR) in 1950 and 1951
(and later its first protocol). These were produced by the Council of
Europe, established in 1949. This was sixteen years before the UN settled
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texts of the two covenants. Under the ECHR states could make complaints
of violations by other states that were parties. These went to a Commis-
sion, which was there to act as a filter and weed out baseless complaints,
investigate the facts, try to secure a friendly settlement, and if this failed
express an opinion as to whether there had been a violation. Some states
had accepted the optional jurisdiction of a European Court of Human
Rights (the Strasbourg court), to which the case might then go for a legal
judgment. The U.K. initially did not consent to the idea of a Court, prefer-
ring the report of the Commission to go to the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe, a political body.
What about the colonies? The convention allowed colonial powers to
extend the Convention to their colonies under a colonial applications
clause. In 1953 the U.K. extended the Convention to virtually all its depen-
dencies. This all sounds as if the U.K. adopted an import view of human
rights. In fact, there was considerable nervousness about the Convention
in some circles in Britain. But the prevailing view was that the Convention
would have no significant domestic effects. One reason was that domestic
British law and practice was thought to conform to the Convention, which
had largely been drafted by the British. Another reason was that at this
time only states could lodge complaints against the U.K., for a right of
individual petition was optional and had not been accepted by the U.K.
Britain's European allies in the Council of Europe were hardly likely to do
so. In the colonies there were, it was known, some skeletons, but given the
absence of any right of individual petition the extension of the Convention
in 1953 was unlikely to make much difference to life. Although the Con-
vention applied, for example, to Malaya, where a major colonial insurrec-
tion was, at this time, being crushed through the use of draconian legal
powers, no European State was interested in complaining about this. So
the Convention caused no problems there.
It was not until 1966 that the U.K. accepted both individual petition
and the Court. By this date the troublesome colonial empire had been
largely dismantled. Again, the belief was that since British law and prac-
tice respected human rights this was unlikely to cause any serious domes-
tic problems.
III. Consternation in Whitehall
The belief that ratifying the Convention and extending it to the colonial
empire would make no great difference proved to have been a mistake.
Between 1955 and 1959 a dispute arose over the colony of Cyprus, in
which both Greece (which wanted to annex Cyprus) and Turkey (which
strongly objected) were involved. Both were members of the Council of
Europe and parties to the European Convention. They were also Britain's
allies in NATO. In 1956 and 1957, in the context of this dispute, the first
interstate cases were brought by Greece against the U.K. alleging extensive
violation of the Convention. Cyprus was then a British colony in the grip
of a major insurrection. Britain reacted by attempts to crush this insurrec-
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tion by military force under an elaborate code of emergency powers. Once
the cases were brought the U.K. had little choice but to respond to the
allegations and go along with the Convention institutions, though this was
not at first fully accepted. With the acceptance of a right of individual
petition in 1966 the practical consequences became much more pervasive.
As a simple example of the current difference between the situation in
the U.K. in relation to the international protection of human rights, and the
position in the U.S.A., suppose the authorities do something very nasty to
you. For example, you are subjected to extremely unpleasant methods of
interrogation (such as the techniques employed in Northern Ireland at one
time, including hooding, wall standing, subjection to continuous loud
noise, etc.), or you are subjected to some brutal method of control in a
prison (such as the use of stun belts in some prisons in the U.S.A.). In
both the U.K. and the U.S.A. you may seek redress through your domestic
law and domestic courts. In the U.S.A. if this fails that is the end of legal
mechanisms at your disposal. Not so in the U.K.; if dissatisfied, you may
then go to Strasbourg. This happened over the methods of interrogation,
and Britain lost. Stun belts would have not the least chance of escaping an
adverse finding by the Strasbourg court, as their use would violate Article 3
of the Convention.
The Convention institutions have recently been rejigged, and the two-
tier system of Commission and Court is gone, leaving just the Court. Since
the system took off in the 1970s the U.K. has been taken to the Court on
many occasions, and has lost a considerable number of cases. Some of
these cases have been extremely troubling to the British Governmental
machine. Indeed, when the first proceedings against the U.K. began in
1956-that is when an import trade in human rights protection effectively
began-there was horror in Whitehall. At once there were discussions in
official circles of how, if at all, the U.K. could extricate itself from the mess
it had gotten into by ratifying the wretched thing in the first place, and then
by extending it to Cyprus.
The second case, started in 1957, accused the U.K. authorities of com-
plicity in the widespread use of torture. No government welcomes investi-
gation of such allegations by an international body, operating through
essentially legal procedures. The U.K. government did co-operate with
these procedures, but there was considerable opposition to this in official
circles. The investigation was overtaken by independent events (the
Cyprus dispute was ended by a political settlement in 1959 and the pro-
ceedings dropped). Although it is likely that this cooperation would have
continued, it is by no means clear that this is the case.
IV. A Problem of Explanation
Why, alone of the three major powers which existed back in the immediate
post war period, did the U.K. subject itself to international supervision in
this way? I do not propose to say anything very much about why the
U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. did not. But I must emphasize that in comparing
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the U.K. and the U.S.A. I am not in the business of simply differentiating
"goodies" from "baddies." Indeed, even a comparison including the
U.S.S.R. would be too simple. Both in the U.K. and its dependencies, and
in the U.S.A., there were in this period serious violations of even minimum
standards of human rights. There were also persons involved in public life
who really believed in human rights. As it turned out only the U.K. signed
up to an obtrusive system of international human rights protection. The
explanation lies in the political and diplomatic history of the period. The
story of how this came about begins with the initiatives undertaken in the
UN.
V. Human Rights in the United Nations
The negotiations that led to the establishment of the United Nations were
dominated by the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and the U.K.; China played a trivial
part. During the war Western public opinion came to accept that the pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (HRFF) constituted a
war aim. This perception owed much to President Roosevelt's speech of 6
January 1941, in which he linked the idea of future security to the protec-
tion of four essential human freedoms: freedom of speech and expression,
freedom or worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. In reality,
the participation of the U.K. in the war, and that of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.
(and of China) had not been triggered by concern over HRFF. But the rea-
sons why countries become involved in wars, the reasons they give for
fighting, and the advantages they hope to achieve if they win, commonly
differ. By the end of the war it was generally accepted that the desired
outcome of the fighting was not just a secure world order, but a just one in
which rights would be respected. Largely in response to U.S. pressure,
public statements to this effect were made during the war. The most nota-
ble was the "Atlantic Charter"-not a treaty, but in origin a press release of
14 August 1941, issued after a meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill.
The Dumbarton Oaks Conference (August-October 1944) established
a set of proposals and developed a scheme for a future world organization.
The emphasis of the proposals was primarily on making the world safe
from war, not on producing a just world based on freedoms. However, the
U.S.A. proposed that the General Assembly of the future organization
should be concerned with making recommendations about the protection
of human rights. After some difficulty with the U.S.S.R. the promotion of
respect for human rights was featured in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as
an aspect of the future arrangements for international economic and social
cooperation. But the proposals did not place a high emphasis on HRFF.
The proposals went to the San Francisco Conference, which produced
the Charter of the UN (June 1945). This gave considerable prominence to
the promotion of HRFF as a task for UNO. The pressure for this change in
emphasis came largely from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
the U.S.A., which were critical of the lack of emphasis on HRFF in the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Both in continental Europe and in the U.K.
Cornell International Law Journal
there had also been much advocacy for the promotion of HRFF by private
individuals and NGOs, though not on the scale of such activity in the
U.S.A. For example, it was very difficult for those in the European resis-
tance to meet, though, a conference did take place in Switzerland during
the war. It was also difficult for European NGOs to attend the conference.
All this private activity produced a number of draft international bills
of rights, including one by the American Law Institute and another by the
British international lawyer Hersch Lauterpacht. There were indeed sug-
gestions, which were not pursued, to incorporate a statement of HRFF in
the UN Charter as a ticket of entry into the UN. The Charter contains a
number of references to HRFF. Promoting and encouraging respect for
them was declared to be one of the purposes of the organization. The
Charter, however, neither enumerates nor defines HRFF, nor does it say
how this purpose was to be achieved.
Under the Charter the Economic and Social Council of the UN
(ECOSOC) held its first sessions in 1946, when it established the Commis-
sion on Human Rights (HRC). The Commission, with eighteen members,
was chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, and held its first session in January and
February 1947. It was charged with producing proposals for an interna-
tional bill of rights and suggestions for "means of implementation." The
HRC received many complaints of violations of HRFF from groups and
individuals, but in 1947 it decided, amid some controversy, that it had no
power to do anything about them. It became, therefore, a body engaged in
drafting work.
The U.K., working through the FO, which of course consulted with
other departments, took an active part in the work of the HRC. The U.K.
government had publicly committed itself to the notion that the UN should
further HRFF, and numerous ministerial statements had expressed this
policy. The official committee, that is one that no Ministers attended, was
the Steering Committee on International Organizations (SCIO), which
established a Working Party on Human Rights (WPHR) in 1947. The
chairman of the WPHR was normally Sir Eric Beckett, FO Legal Adviser,
and something of an enthusiast for HRFF. The other departments chiefly
involved were the Home Office (HO) and the Colonial Office (CO). At this
time the U.K. was responsible for a vast and somewhat ramshackle colonial
empire, with various sorts of colonies, protectorates, protected states, and
condominia. The U.K. also administered some territories, for example Pal-
estine, under League of Nations Mandates. It was all very complicated, and
in some instances it was obscure what the status of a dependency was.
Some dependencies were virtually self-governing internally, and others had
no local legislatures at all. The CO was normally the department con-
cerned, but some territories, for example the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, were
the concern of the FO.
There was little conflict between the FO and HO over international
negotiations concerning HRFF. The HO viewed the U.K. as the home of
HRFF with nothing to fear. There was, however, considerable conflict
between the FO and CO, whose officials viewed each other with considera-
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ble suspicion. The FO was not, of course, involved in governing (as was
the CO) and its officials therefore were not so inclined to view HRFF as a
potential nuisance or even menace.
The FO produced an incomplete draft International Bill of Human
Rights, which was published on 6 June 1947. It was submitted to the Secre-
tariat of the HRC. The initial work on this draft was undertaken by Geof-
frey M. Wilson, a barrister who joined the Cabinet Office as a temporary
assistant secretary in 1947. He was used because the FO did not regard
the work as of high priority at this time, and its senior officials were heav-
ily committed to other matters. Also, they had come of age long before
HRFF were a matter of concern. Beckett worked on the draft. This Bill was
not intended to commit the U.K. government. Since producing the UN Bill
of Rights would involve prolonged negotiations, it would have been inap-
propriate to commit the U.K. to a text in advance of negotiations, which
would necessarily involve give and take.
VI. Why Become Involved?
FO and U.K. involvement was motivated by a number of factors, of which
the following are the more important:
a) Ministerial statements supporting the idea that HRFF required
international protection, both for simple humanitarian reasons and
because their violation could threaten peace;
b) simple humanitarian enthusiasm amongst officials, encouraged by
the horrors of the recent past;
c) the desire to exercise international leadership over the protection of
HRFF and enhance British prestige;
d) the desire to provide a model, based upon British traditions, which
other countries might be encouraged to follow;
e) the desire to use a UN Bill of Rights as a weapon in the ideological
struggle against totalitarianism, and increasingly against the Soviet bloc.
One might now imagine that the European Holocaust, would, as such,
feature prominently in the documents. In fact, this is not so. It was a fac-
tor, but a less prominent factor than one would expect. The immediate
post-war response to the Holocaust was the Genocide Convention of 1948,
not the Universal Declaration.
It was never supposed by the FO or HO that an international Bill of
HRFF would make any practical difference within the U.K. The underlying
assumption was that HRFF were adequately protected both in the U.K., and
in all Western democracies, including the U.S.A. There was some unease
over certain laws and practices in some British colonies (for example
restrictions on internal freedom of movement, and the use of punitive
bombing to control inter-tribal violence in the Southern Arabian Emirates),
even if some could be justified by local conditions. There was also some
concern over the discriminatory laws and practices of some of the states of
the U.S.A.
Cornell International Law Journal
In the period immediately after the war there was considerable opti-
mism over the UN and its future activities. The scheme established under
the Charter was based upon the assumption that wartime collaboration
between the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and the U.K. would continue. Late in the
war, and immediately after it, the U.S.A. took the line that it could get along
with the Soviets, it was the U.K. and its colonies which was the problem.
This perception changed in 1946 and thereafter, and the British Common-
wealth came to be viewed as a valuable bastion against communism.
VII. The Negotiations at the HRC
British amateurism, and the idea that intelligent people (in effect, Oxbridge
graduates from leading British private schools) could turn to any subject,
characterized the negotiations. The representative at the HRC was Charles
Dukes (became in 1947 Lord Dukeston), a trade unionist with no expertise
in HRFF. He was assisted by Wilson. Beckett wanted a distinguished
jurist, but was overruled; Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin did not like intel-
lectuals. Dukeston was expected to act under instructions prepared in the
FO and approved by the WPHR and SCIO. The basic starting assumption
made by the U.K. (and by the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.) was that disputes con-
cerning HRFF were matters of domestic jurisdiction, except perhaps when
a real threat to the peace was involved, and therefore outside the compe-
tence of the UN. If a threat to the peace arose, that was a matter for the
Security Council, not for the HRC. However states could, by treaty, volun-
tarily undertake obligations, or even submit themselves to some form of
international supervision. What the UN could do through the HRC,
ECOSOC, and the General Assembly was to promote their protection only
by means that did not involve interference in matters of domestic jurisdic-
tion. It could, for example, draft a HRFF convention and recommend
states adopt it, but no more. Or it could draft and commend a statement of
HRFF, or set up educational programs about HRFF.
The policies agreed and adopted by the WPHR were that:
(a) The U.K. should work for the production of a draft international
convention, that is a treaty, which would, on ratification, impose interna-
tional legal obligations on those states that participated, rather than a draft
declaration of rights which, even if adopted by a resolution of the General
Assembly, would not be legally binding on anyone.
(b) The U.K. should ensure that the rights were clearly defined,
together with the limitations upon them.
(c) The U.K. should ensure that social, economic, and cultural rights
were not included. There was some disagreement over political rights,
which were favored by Dukeston and the junior FO Minister, Hector
McNeil, but viewed nervously by the CO; the U.K. Bill did not include
them. However it was thought that it might be difficult to exclude political
rights at the HRC.
(d) The U.K. should ensure that practical means of enforcement were
included, though initially it was not very clear what they might be. The FO
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was inclined to favor a procedure modeled on that evolved before the war
under the post war Minorities Treaties and the League of Nations. There
was opposition in the FO, particularly by Beckett to the idea of allowing
individuals or groups to present their complaints formally to some organ of
the UN, such as the HRC-a right of individual petition. The CO consist-
ently opposed such a right. The FO officials postponed taking a decision
by making the line that, until the protected HRFF were dearly defined, it
was premature to settle questions of implementation.
(e) Whatever was done about enforcement, there should be no right to
take a complaint to an international court, as advocated by Australia. The
U.K., U.S.S.R., and U.S.A., in an unholy alliance, were consistently opposed
to such a court. It was not until 1966 that the U.K. view changed.
Underlying the approach of the FO was the idea that the Covenant
would, in effect, codify the existing practice in the U.K., serving as a model
for other countries, and as a weapon to curb excesses in totalitarian states.
The Home Office (HO) went along with this; the Colonial Office (CO) and
Commonwealth Relations Office, which handled relations with self-gov-
erning dominions were a trifle nervous. The Lord Chancellor's Office and
Law Officers' Department were not initially represented in the official com-
mittees. Since they neither handled international affairs nor were directly
involved in governing there was no reason why they should have been.
VIII. A Declaration and a Covenant
During 1947 the UN institutions came around to the idea of producing
both a Declaration and a Covenant, which together would form the Bill of
Rights. The former would constitute a statement of ideals to which, it was
hoped, all states would ultimately conform. The Declaration would not
itself impose any international legal obligations. The Covenant would be
quite different in its legal effect; it would be a multilateral treaty that would
impose international legal obligations only on countries that adhered to it.
The "means of implementation" (i.e., means of enforcement) might form
part of the Covenant, or might appear in some other way, for example, as
the terms of reference for the HRC. The U.K. went along with this, pro-
vided that both Declaration and Covenant were produced at the same time.
The FO view was that there was no harm in having a Declaration, but the
Covenant must be regarded as the core of the operation. A Declaration was
no substitute for an effective Covenant. The State Department appears to
have thought that a Declaration was all that was needed, at least for the
moment, and Eleanor Roosevelt, no doubt acting on instructions, came to
be suspected by the U.K. and others of trying to sabotage the idea of draft-
ing a covenant.
The Declaration was developed out of a shopping list draft produced
by the Secretariat, derived from the numerous drafts on offer at the time
(for example, those produced by the American Law Institute and Hersch
Lauterpacht) and from provisions found in national constitutions, virtually
all of which embodied statements of rights. It became the Universal Decla-
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ration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the General Assembly in
December 1948. In the course of the negotiations the FO changed its pol-
icy and reluctantly agreed to the adoption of a Declaration before an agreed
text of the Covenant had been produced. It continued, however, to press
for a Covenant.
The main U.K. effort, however, went into the drafting of the Covenant,
and the FO International Bill of Human Rights became the basic working
document for the HRC. An HRC Working Group on the Convention,
appointed in late 1947, was chaired by Lord Dukeston, reflecting the
importance of the U.K. contribution. Neither the U.S.A. nor the U.S.S.R.
had put forward any rival comprehensive draft. A draft UN Covenant was
indeed produced in late 1947, but little further progress was made on it in
1948, since the preoccupation was with the UDHR. Lord Dukeston died in
1948, and was temporarily replaced by Geoffrey Wilson. His long-term
replacement was Miss Marguerite Bowie, one of the first women barristers
in England. She was not an international lawyer, and she had never prac-
ticed as a lawyer, though she had practiced as an insurance broker. Miss
Bowie was assisted by Wilson and later by Martin Le Quesne, a junior FO
official of considerable ability but little legal knowledge. He had studied
law in Oxford for one year, and previously worked in the Embassy in Bagh-
dad. Again, it may seem curious that the negotiations were not handled by
a senior FO official. Although the operation was taken seriously in the FO,
under the influence of Beckett, it was not initially treated as being of the
highest importance. Some officials in the FO indeed regarded the UDHR
as little more than pious hot air. Hersch Lauterpacht, perhaps the leading
scholar of human rights of the period, viewed it with something approach-
ing contempt.
IX. Conflicts and Problems at the UN
In 1949 work on the Covenant resumed and by now serious problems
began to arise. Some were internal. In 1948 a division of opinion had
developed within the U.K. government machine. The FO, joined in due
course, though with a little unease, by the HO, came around to thinking it
would be impossible to resist the acceptance of a right of individual (and
group) petition. Public statements by Dukeston and others, public opinion
in the U.K., and international opinion, tended to favor such a right, and
there was a consensus that in principle it was hardly possible to resist the
idea if HRFF were to be taken seriously. The CO, beleaguered by the
extremely vocal anti-colonial movement, became increasingly opposed to
conceding the right except as a final resort, and only if accompanied by
elaborate safeguards. Arguments were made that it would confuse the loy-
alty of colonial subjects, be exploited by agitators and communists, and
clog the machinery with huge numbers of petitions. The U.K. delegation to
the HRC contrived to avoid taking up a firm position one way or the other
on the matter; there was a feeling that in the end other states would be
unlikely to accept such a right.
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The CO was also aware that the laws and practices of some colonies
might be difficult to reconcile with a Covenant, and that some might not
agree to the extension of the Covenant to them. It was not at this time the
practice to extend international agreements of the character of the pro-
posed Covenant to colonies without securing the consent of the colonial
government. Although most such governments, if not all, could be
coerced, this was not the practice followed. There were various disagree-
ments between the FO and the CO over how the problem posed by the
colonies should be handled. For example, the CO at one point argued for a
scheme under which the Covenant could be extended to colonies with res-
ervations. The FO thought this would simply provide ammunition to the
Soviets and the anti-colonialists and was a worse option than not extending
it at all. The CO did not want to facilitate criticism from the anti-colonial
lobby by conceding that HRFF posed problems in the Colonies. At the
same time, it wanted to be a little selective in extending any Covenant to
them. Some Colonial Governments were horrified by the UDHR and
refused to publish it locally. The CO in London tended to be more liberal
than some of the local colonial governments, especially those dominated
by settlers.
Acceptance of a right of individual petition did not necessarily entail
establishing a Court-such petitions might go, for example, to the HRC. It
was also possible to have a machinery for dealing with communications
from individuals, treating them as a source of information, without adopt-
ing the notion that an individual had legal power to initiate proceedings of
a legal character; this had been the League of Nations system for
minorities.
At the international level there were also problems which became
acute in 1949. In particular the U.K. had serious disagreements with the
U.S.A. The officials began to suspect that all the U.S.A. wanted was a Cove-
nant which was sufficiently vacuous to be acceptable to Congress, the
underlying reason for this being the notorious institutionalized discrimina-
tion in the southern states. Trouble centered on the U.S.A.'s pressure for a
"general limitations clause" spelling out in vague language the permissible
limitations of the HRFF, and for a "federal applications clause" enabling
the U.S.A. to sign up whilst the laws of some of its constituent states vio-
lated HRFF.
The U.S.A. in turn opposed the U.K. demand for a "Colonial Applica-
tions" clause which would enable the U.K. to sign up without the Covenant
automatically applying forthwith to its colonial dependencies. The Com-
monwealth country that took the most active role was Australia, which
advocated a Court of Human Rights, and was thus also at odds with the
FO, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R.
Matters grew worse, from the FO point of view, when the General
Assembly in 1950 passed resolutions to the effect that the Covenant should
embrace economic, social and cultural rights, and possibly a right of
national self-determination, which alarmed the CO. There was also grow-
ing displeasure at the UN as a forum for anti-colonial pressure, and genu-
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ine disillusion at the hypocrisy of the behavior of some governments there.
The reality of the matter was perhaps that the approach of even the better
governments to HRFF always involved some degree of hypocrisy.
Initially the U.S.S.R. representative on the HRC did not squabble with
the U.K. or U.S.A., but by 1948 Soviet bloc representatives devoted much
time to violent attacks on them. There were also real ideological differ-
ences-the Soviet representatives thought that social and economic rights,
rather than political freedoms, were of primary importance. They also
took a strong position on non-interference in matters of domestic
jurisdiction.
X. The Growing Disillusion
The initial enthusiasm over the UN became impossible to maintain in the
climate of the Cold War.
To sum up a complex story, it was thought that the U.K. was unlikely
to secure from the UN the sort of Covenant it wanted, that agreement was
unlikely ever to be reached, and that if a Covenant was drafted many states
might never sign up to it. It came to be suggested as desirable for the U.K.
to withdraw entirely from the UN HRFF exercise-a possibility which was
to be very seriously considered in 1951, and one which had been mooted
in 1948 and 1949. The deteriorating international situation aggravated the
problems, and by about 1950 the FO believed the chief obstacle to progress
was the Soviet bloc and the anti-colonial powers, rather than the U.S.A.
Indeed, the U.K. began to wonder whether it had been rather a mistake to
become so locked into disagreements with the U.S.A. over, for example, the
federal applications problem. Was it not better to make concessions to
such friends as you had?
In 1951 it became U.K. policy to delay, so far as possible, the produc-
tion of a draft Covenant without actually withdrawing from the exercise.
This decision does not seem to have made a great deal of difference to U.K.
participation.
British disillusion was matched by developments in the U.S.A.
The decision at the UN to include social and economic rights
presented special difficulties for the U.S. and was bound to generate strong
opposition in the Senate. President Truman still wished to support the
Convention in an election year; problems over economic and social rights
might be solved by having a separate covenant (the solution eventually
adopted) or by some system of reservations. In 1951, however, Charles
Malik had succeeded Eleanor Roosevelt as Chairman of the HRC, a move
welcomed by Humphrey of the Secretariat, who now described her Chair-
manship as "incredibly bad," adding that "as spokesman for the State
Department, she had also become one of the most reactionary forces."'4 He
welcomed the change as ending the influence of her State Department
4. II J.P. HUMPHREY, ON THE EDGE OF GREATNss: THE DARiES OF JOHN HUMPHREY,
FIRs-r DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS DMSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 193 (AJ. Hobbins ed.,
1996).
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adviser, James Simsarian, for Malik refused to become the mouthpiece of
the State Department.
In 1951 Senator John Bricker of Ohio proposed to the Senate that the
U.S. should take no further part in negotiating the covenant. Between
1952 and 1957 his name was associated with a succession of attempts to
amend the U.S. Constitution. The intention was to ensure that ratification
of a treaty would not confer on the Congress a power to legislate to imple-
ment the treaty unless Congress would have possessed the relevant legisla-
tive power without a treaty. It was essential to this scheme to provide that
treaties were not self-executing, so that legislation was necessary if they
were to have domestic effect. The aim was to reverse Missouri v. Holland,5
to protect "states rights" from being whittled away through the use of the
treaty making power and, more mysteriously, to protect the U.S.A. from the
loss of sovereignty caused by ratifying international instruments which
impinged on domestic affairs. Viewed more broadly, the Bricker amend-
ments (for there were a number of versions of the proposal) attempted to
resist the relentless expansion of the frontiers of international law. Inter-
national human rights conventions were viewed as the chief menace. The
movement was encouraged by the decision of the California District Court
of Appeal in Sei Fujii v. State,6 which invalidated the discriminatory Alien
Land Law as contrary to the UDHR. The decision was reversed on appeal,
but only on the ground that the Declaration was not a self-executing
treaty.7
The Constitution was not amended, and it has been argued that even if
it had been this might not have restricted the progressive enlargement of
Congressional power. But politically Bricker won the battle. Once the
Republican administration of President Eisenhower took over in 1953 Elea-
nor Roosevelt, who was strongly disliked by the new President, was some-
what curtly told that she would not in future be representing her country
at the United Nations. Within the State Department in February 1953 the
arguments for and against a change in policy were analyzed in a long mem-
orandum by Simsarian: "A change in position would be difficult to explain
.... To withdraw support... would be interpreted by at least some other
countries as a step backward in the world effort to promote universal obser-
vance of human rights."8 The memorandum, which echoes ideas under
consideration in Britain at the time, went on to make suggestions as to how
the new policy might be implemented. The possibilities included, for
example, complete withdrawal from the negotiations, or continued partici-
pation coupled with obstruction.
John Foster Dulles was fearful that the Bricker Amendment would
gravely restrict the ability of the executive to conduct foreign affairs. He
decided to sacrifice human rights to protect that ability. So on 6 April,
1953, he gave an assurance to the Senate Judiciary Committee that no
5. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
6. 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. App. 1950).
7. 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
8. NA, Dep't of State RG 59 Lot File 62D 205.
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 34
human rights convention would be submitted to it and, in particular, that
the U.S. did not propose to sign the Convention on the Political Rights of
Women. A State Department Circular stated that "[t]reaties are not to be
used as a device for the purpose of effecting internal social changes, or to
try to circumvent the constitutional procedures established in relation to
what are essentially matters of domestic concern."9
In a deeply unattractive letter to Mrs. Oswald B. Lloyd, now the U.S.
member of the Commission, which it is difficult to believe he personally
drafted, Dulles expressed his government's deep commitment to the
advancement of human rights and the work of the United Nations, and
went on to set out the new policy: "the United States Government has
reached the conclusion that we should not at this time become a party to
any multilateral treaty such as those contemplated in the draft Covenants
on Human Rights, and that we now work towards the objectives of the Dec-
laration by other means."10 As to the other means the letter was not very
specific, but proposed "other suggestions of method, based on American
experience, for developing throughout the world a human rights con-
science which will bring nearer the goals stated in the Charter."" In his
statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee he mentioned persuasion,
education, and example. The basic reasons given for the change were that
the covenants were unlikely to be effective because of the widespread lack
of respect for human rights and were unlikely to be widely ratified. Subse-
quently new mechanisms were evolved whereby the U.S.A. has contrived to
ensure that international human rights conventions, even if ratified, are
deprived of all domestic significance. Thus did the U.S.A. forfeit its posi-
tion as the most powerful protagonist of the human rights movement.
And so did the honeymoon with the UN and HRFF end. In the end the
UN Covenant became two Covenants, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These covenants were not opened to
signature until 1966, and they first came into force in 1976.
XI. A Regional European Covenant
It was in part because of the growing disillusion with the UN that the idea
of attempting to negotiate a Western European regional covenant on
Human Rights was considered in U.K. official circles. Throughout the his-
tory of the UN there had always been those who had little confidence in the
idea of a world organization and who favored a regional approach. The
first appearance of the idea of a regional covenant is a minute by Beckett of
the FO in June 1948. He was sympathetic to the idea that the U.K. might
try to negotiate a Human Rights Covenant with the Brussels powers-the
five countries which had entered into the Brussels Treaty of 17 March
1948: the U.K., France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. At
9. II FAM 700, 796, State Dep't Circular no. 175.
10. NA, Dep't of State RG 59 340.1 AG 4-350 Box 1327.
11. Id.
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this date the Council of Europe had not yet been established. One of the
ideas behind this was that amongst Western European countries there
might not be the sources of disagreement that had bedeviled the UN
negotiations.
The main impetus, however, came from two other factors. One was a
radical change in British foreign policy, made public by Foreign Secretary
Ernest Bevin in a speech to the Commons on 22 January 1948. The other
was the pressure exerted by unofficial bodies seeking the integration and
eventual federation of Western Europe. Underlying both was the tradi-
tional European fear of the destruction of Western European culture by
"the barbarians at the gates"-once the Goths and Vandals and Huns-now
represented by the increasingly demonised Soviet bloc.
XII. The Change in British Foreign Policy
There had long existed apprehension over Russian expansionism, and a
school of thought that favored the creation of some form of Western Euro-
pean bloc to protect the security and civilization of Western Europe. Per-
haps in addition such a bloc, together with its colonies, could act as a
counterbalance to the power of the U.S.A., a third world force based on
social democracy rather than on free market capitalism or communism.
But U.K. foreign policy from 1945 resisted openly promoting this idea, in
part in the hope of achieving security through the world organization of
the UN, and also to avoid antagonizing the Soviets, with whom the U.K.
continued to try to get along. There was also fear that formation of such a
bloc would encourage U.S. isolationism; the U.K. wanted the U.S.A. to be
involved in European defence. The only action which involved a formal
link between the U.K. and a Western European power, and which might
seem an exception to this policy, was the largely symbolic Anglo-French
Treaty of Dunkirk of March 1947, explicitly directed only against possible
German aggression. This did not create a Western bloc, and the Treaty did
not establish any permanent institutional structure for co-operation.
The condition of Western Europe after the war was very bad indeed.
Germany was devastated and incapable of feeding its population; formerly
occupied countries had collapsed economies; there was serious fear of a
communist take over of both Italy and of France, which were both politi-
cally extremely unstable. Alone of the Western democracies the U.K.,
though economically in a parlous condition, still possessed significant mil-
itary power, but power quite inadequate to its commitments. The general
deterioration of relations with the Soviet bloc in 1946 and 1947, the Soviet
takeover of power in Eastern Europe, and in particular the wholly hostile
Soviet attitude to the Marshall plan, whereby the U.S.A offered economic
aid to Europe (including Eastern Europe), led to a change in British policy
initiated by the submission of a number of papers to the Cabinet in late
1947 and 1948, one being titled "The Extinction of Human Rights in East-
ern Europe." This was the first British Cabinet paper explicitly concerned
with human rights.
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On 22 January, in his speech to the Commons, Bevin came out openly
in favor of Western Union; what precisely he had in mind is not entirely
clear, but he spoke of the need for "a spiritual union" and said that "the
union must primarily be a fusion derived from the basic freedoms and
ethical principles for which we all stand."12 The background to Bevin's
speech was the idea that Western Europe must counter the Soviet threat
not only by some form of military alliance, which had to include the U.S.A.
because of European weakness, but also by offering some alternative vision
to Russian communism, and by tackling the economic conditions which
encouraged its spread. It needed also to win the propaganda battle. In
1948 there was real fear in the minds of some European statesmen that the
Russians might be at the Pyrenees in a matter of weeks.
Whether the U.S.S.R. really did threaten world domination or not is
disputed. It is perhaps worth noting that the diplomats whose communica-
tions from Moscow signaled the start of the Cold War-George Kennan
(U.S.A.) and Frank Roberts (U.K.)-never took such an alarmist view as
later became current. The U.K. Field Marshal Montgomery, who visited
Russia in 1947, regarded Russia as constituting no military threat whatever
to Western Europe at this time, not because of the military strength of the
West, but because of Soviet reluctance to subject itself to a new war. From
the other side the Russian Ambassador in Washington, Nikolai Novikoff,
sent alarming communications to Moscow on U.S. plans for world domina-
tion, made clear by U.S. enthusiasm for the acquisition of a world wide
chain of military bases, many very far away from the U.S.A. What else
were they for?
Whatever the rights and wrongs, in the period 1946-1949 there was
very considerable anxiety in Western Europe over the future. In 1948 the
only European power capable of exercising significant leadership was, for
better or worse, the U.K.
The first practical outcome of Bevin's new policy was the Brussels
Treaty of 17 March 1948, whose preamble, drafted by Beckett of the FO,
included this passage:
Resolved. To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dig-
nity and worth of the human person and in the other ideal proclaimed in the
Charter of the United Nations;
To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and
political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are
their common heritage
13
Bevin's proposed "Western Union" had sounded like a proposal for a
single Western European organization; whether he intended this or not is
problematic, but, to anticipate, the actual outcome was three different bod-
ies-the Brussels Treaty organization (1948), the Council of Europe
(1949), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949). This becomes
12. 446 PRuL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1948) 407.
13. Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Col-
lective Self-Defence, Mar. 17, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51, 53.
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four if you add the Organization for European Economic Co-operation
(OEEC), set up before his speech was delivered in response to the Marshall
plan.
XIII. The European Movement
Another factor was the Continental European pressure for federation. A
number of unofficial Western European organizations, many of whose
members favored the formation of a federated Europe, had combined in
1947 to form the United Europe Movement. This was dominated by the
experience of continental Europeans of the wartime period, and in particu-
lar of occupation; only federation could protect against the excesses of
nation states that had produced this horror. The movement was-organized
by the British former Minister Duncan Sandys. Winston Churchill, then in
opposition after his fall from power in 1945, placed himself at the head of
this movement. It is unlikely that he ever favored a federation that
included the U.K. British leadership of the movement and involved domi-
nance by those who, never having experienced occupation, seem never to
have fully understood the motivation of European federalists.
In May 1948 the movement held a highly publicized Congress at the
Hague, attended by a remarkable number of significant European politi-
cians. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, a Conservative M.P., who had been a U.K.
prosecutor at Nuremberg, was associated with this movement, which was
regarded with some hostility by the U.K. Labour government. One of the
two principal resolutions passed at this Congress called for the establish-
ment of a European Parliamentary Assembly. The other called for a Euro-
pean Charter of Human Rights, together with a Court to which citizens
would have access.
The aim was not revolutionary but conservative: to protect the free-
dom that currently existed in Western Europe.
Before the Hague Congress met a committee associated with it had
produced a Rapport and a Projet de Declaration des Droits. The rapporteur
was one Alexandre Marc, a prominent federalist, and the committee
included some distinguished international lawyers, including Charles De
Visscher. The Congress proposed a Declaration of Rights-that is, an enu-
meration of them-and a Convention to confer on the rights "an obligatory
juridical character." This was to be achieved in part by establishment of
the right of individual petition and a court of human rights. There were to
be barriers (barrages) between complainant and court to decide on admis-
sibility of complaints, seek to secure conciliation, ensure that domestic
remedies be first exhausted, weed out frivolous or malicious complaints
and so forth. This is the germ of the idea of the European Commission of
Human Rights.
The Hague Congress established a Commission under the Belgian
Jean Drapier to draft the Charter. Little progress was achieved until 1949,
when the British section of the European Movement took the initiative, with
Drapier's agreement. By the time any progress was made the negotiations
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to establish the Council of Europe were nearing completion. The Treaty
was signed in May 1949.
In September 1948 the European Parliamentary Union, an organiza-
tion of members of parliaments that had supported the Hague Congress,
met and agreed to a Declaration of Human Rights of ten articles, drafted in
very general terms. This was a copy of a concise form of UDHR, which the
U.S.A. had promoted at the UN in 1947-48 without success. The Union
also favored creating a Supreme Court of Europe with jurisdiction both
over the constitution of a federal Europe and over Human Rights.
Thus European enthusiasm for a Charter of Human Rights was closely
linked to federalist plans. The model was the U.S.A.
XIV. Enlarging "Western Union"
The idea of producing a regional Charter was taken up by Francis Rundall,
another FO official, in late 1948. One of the arguments he used was that it
was desirable for governments to regain the initiative from private hands,
that is from the European Movement and associated organizations. His
other argument was that a European Charter produced by the five Brussels
powers would be useful to provide a ticket of entry to an enlarged group of
Western powers, formed around the nucleus of the Brussels Treaty. It had
always been envisaged that the five original Brussels powers might be
joined by other respectable European States, for example, the Scandinavian
countries, to form a larger bloc. In the long term it was desirable to reinte-
grate Germany into Europe; since it was now divided because of the failure
to reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. this would involve West Germany
only.
In early in 1949 Rundall's proposal was dropped because it was
thought that it would not be possible for the U.K. to secure control over the
negotiations. It was feared that France would be represented by Ren6 Cas-
sin, and Belgium by Fernand Dehousse, both viewed by the FO as loose
cannons. Luxembourg would always vote with France. Hence the U.K.
would be outvoted.
As it turned out the Brussels powers were not joined by others through
accession to the Brussels Treaty. For reasons I pass by negotiations were
opened in the summer of 1948 through the Consultative Council of the
Brussels Powers over possible further European integration through a new
treaty. These negotiations were divisive, the British being blamed for
obstructing ambitious plans for European integration. In due course the
negotiations led to the formation of the Council of Europe in May of 1949.
Five new States (Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) joined the
five Brussels powers to form a new organization. The Statute (i.e., Treaty)
of the Council of Europe was an uneasy compromise between the European
federalist movement, which hoped to establish something in the nature of a
United States of Europe, with a European parliament vested with real pow-
ers, and the British desire to limit the conception of a "Western Union" to
an informal system of co-operation between the governments of Western
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states. This was to involve no surrender of sovereignty, and was not to
duplicate the activities of other organizations, including the OEEC and
NATO. The outcome was deeply disappointing to enthusiasts for greater
European integration, and the U.K. was strongly criticized for adopting a
negative attitude. In, fact the U.K.-was not alone, but it did dominate the
negotiations.
The basic structure involved a Committee of Ministers, whose powers
could only be exercised by unanimity, and a Consultative Assembly, which
lacked any executive or legislative powers and had severely restricted com-
petence. For example, the Assembly could not discuss defence. The
Assembly was not directly elected, and each country could choose who
attended as it wished. Once the Consultative Assembly met the two com-
ponent parts of the Council fell to quarrelling. What was never controver-
sial, however, was the idea that the members of the Council were
committed to the protection of HRFF. The Statute referred to this, though
without explicitly requiring a Charter of Human Rights. Judging from the
papers, the Statute was drafted by Beckett in the FO. The Statute was
signed on 5 May 1949.
XV. The European Movement's Scheme
In late 1948 and early 1949 the European Movement began work on its
scheme for human rights protection; Maxwell-Fyfe was the most prominent
person involved, but an obscure barrister, John Harcourt Barrington, was
paid to do most of the work. Professors Arthur Goodhart (an American
residing in the U.K.) and Hersch Lauterpacht were involved, although
details are obscure. They adopted a plan in January. There was to be a list
of rights and municipal courts would primarily be responsible for enforce-
ment. But there would also be a European Court, which would not, how-
ever, function as a supreme court of appeal. Individuals and states could
petition, and their petitions would go in the first instance to an intermedi-
ate body (called a Council) that would police access to the Court, and
investigate complaints. This is basically the scheme envisaged in the Marc
Rapport.
The International Council of the European Movement met in February
1949 during the negotiations for the Council of Europe. From the U.K.,
Maxwell-Fyfe, Goodhart, and Lauterpacht attended. There had been prior
consultations with the French Professors M.C. Chaumont, Joliot de la
Morandire (Dean of the Paris Law Faculty), Georges Scelle, and Ren6 Cas-
sin. In early March a proposal for a European Court of Human Rights was
sent to the FO with a view to influencing the negotiations. A concise list of
"those individual, family and social rights of an economic, political, relig-
ious or other nature which it is necessary and practical to protect by judi-
cial process"'14 was compiled. It was recommended that rights should be
judicially protected, ultimately by a Court, which might issue a judgment
requiring State implementation, and award reparation. However, petitions
14. U.K. PRO FO 371/117924/Z2144.
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would only be admissible if domestic remedies had been exhausted, and
they would first go to a Commission, which would investigate and seek
conciliation, and control access to the Court.
To carry the plan further a Juridical Section of the European Move-
ment was established, and Pierre-Henri Teitgen (former French Minister
and resistance organizer) became its Chairman, Jean Drapier (Belgian) its
Vice-Chairman, and Maxwell-Fyfe and Professor Fernand Dehousse (Bel-
gian) its co-rapporteurs. Various other jurists were consulted.
The Statute of the Council of Europe was signed in May 1949, and a
modified proposal was approved and submitted to the Committee of Minis-
ters on 12 July. This embodied a list enumerating the rights to be pro-
tected, included an undertaking by states to respect democracy, allow
political opposition and hold regular elections with universal suffrage and
free elections, and contained a general limitations clause. It was envisaged
that fuller definitions of rights might later be produced. The scheme for
enforcement followed the earlier model. Ultimately if member State failed
to implement an order from the Court the Committee of Ministers would
have to decide what action to take.
XVI. The FO Reaction to the European Movement's Scheme
These proposals were basically anathema to the FO-no clear definitions,
and a Court, and what one civil servant called "a meddling Commission."
However, the FO was not anxious to appear negative to the protection of
HRFF, having just led the negotiations that produced a Council of Europe,
built explicitly around the need for their protection as an aspect of the Cold
War with the Soviet bloc.
Relations with the Soviets had continued to deteriorate since Bevin's
speech in January 1948, for example, through the Prague coup of February
1948 and the blockade of Berlin in the summer. This produced in official
circles a fear of imminent war, and gave urgency to the idea of producing
an ideological statement of the principles of liberal democracy as an alter-
native to the rival communist ideology, whose extension over Western
Europe was so feared.
The Consultative Assembly was to meet in August 1949. Its agenda
was controlled by the Ministers, which was a bone of contention. The U.K.
proposed that the definition, maintenance and further realization of HRFF
should be on the agenda, thereby reviving in a slightly different form Beck-
ett and Rundall's proposal. Behind this lay the FO's desires to find some-
thing useful and harmless for the Assembly (dominated by federalists) to
work on and to not appear negative towards the Council. The U.K. was at
first unable to secure consensus for this, in effect being outvoted. After
protests from Churchill on behalf of the Assembly the item was, however,
restored. The FO line was that the Assembly should be encouraged to seek
to produce a clear definition of rights before considering their enforce-
ment, in accordance with established FO policy: definition first, implemen-
tation later.
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So the Assembly debated the matter, the chief speakers being Teitgen
and Maxwell-Fyfe. The former suggested a Convention that would at once
provide a collective guarantee of HRFF as at present defined by the domes-
tic law of member states, and establish a Commission and Court, as the
European Movement had proposed. Later a full code might be produced,
but immediate action was needed. This plan got around the difficulty of
agreeing on a regional set of definitions. It only makes sense if one remem-
bers the very grave fears of the period and the experience of those whose
countries had been occupied. Maxwell-Fyfe put forward the European
Movement's proposals, which did not involve precise definitions of rights,
but was merely a list and a statement of the essentials of democracy. The
matter was then referred to the Committee on Legal and Administrative
Questions, whose Chairman was Maxwell-Fyfe, with Teitgen as Rapporteur.
This committee, which was not unanimous, came back to the Assem-
bly with a proposal for a Convention that merely provided general defini-
tions of the principal HRFF in the UDHR. Member states would have wide
discretion as to precisely how these would be guaranteed in their law in
accordance with what is now called the "principle of subsidiarity" and the
"doctrine of the margin of appreciation." There would also be a general
limitations clause. The Committee adopted the basic scheme for enforce-
ment proposed by the European Movement. With some disagreement and
controversy, in particular over the right of individual petition, the Assem-
bly adopted the committee's proposals, which it communicated, with a
draft, to the Committee of Ministers.
XVII. Reestablishing Governmental Control
The outcome of the proceedings now appeared to be likely to lead to the
production of a Convention of a type wholly at odds with FO thinking-no
clear definitions, a general limitations clause, a right of individual petition,
a meddling Commission, and a Court of Human Rights.
The Ministers decided to refer the whole question to a committee of
expert jurists. This conformed to the idea that Human Rights had an
objective existence and that what was needed was to consult those who
were expert in the subject, rather than to constitute Human Rights by nego-
tiation between Government representatives acting under instructions.
The FO also supported this procedure as a technique for taking the matter
out of the control of the Assembly and the European Movement, and back
to governmental control. Most, but not all, states appointed persons who
counted as jurists, and who acted simply as individuals. The U.K.
appointed Sir Oscar Dowson, who had been legal adviser to the HO. He
was not a good negotiator, and was by now beginning to lose his eyesight
so that he could not manage his papers.
The FO took the line that the Assembly draft was quite unsuitable as
the basis for a binding Convention, and set out to try to ensure that its
ideas as to the form of a Convention (based upon its 1947 International
Bill of Human Rights, to some degree as modified in the course of the UN
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negotiations on the Covenant) should form the basis of the European Con-
vention. So Dowson was instructed to follow the established FO line. In
effect his brief was to get the experts to accept the proposals that the U.K.
had been advancing in the UN HRC, with the addition of some rights not in
the U.K. proposal (dealing with torture, fair trials, presumption of inno-
cence, and right to marry) to which no objection was made. But since the
U.K. had not advocated the inclusion of a protected right of property
(which was in the European Movement proposal) he was to oppose its
inclusion, and, for the same reason, oppose any provision safeguarding
political freedom or democracy.
The experts held two sets of meetings, and were chaired by the Bel-
gian, Ltienne de la Vall~e Poussin, an enthusiastic federalist. France was
represented by Chaumont. It was with difficulty that Dowson persuaded
the committee to consider anything except the European Movement's
scheme. For the second round of meetings Dowson was assisted by Le
Quesne and was more effective. Eventually the committee failed to achieve
a consensus. So the experts produced two drafts of the substantive rights,
one based on the European Movement's scheme, the other on the U.K.
scheme. On enforcement there was general support for the idea of a Com-
mission, but a majority was opposed to establishing a court, with France,
Italy, Belgium, and Ireland being in favor. No firm decisions were taken.
XVIII. The Conference of High Officials
The use of the experts had failed to achieve the U.K. objective of regaining
governmental control and rejecting the European Movement's proposals.
When the Committee of Ministers met to consider the report of the experts
the U.K. proposed that the report should now be considered by a confer-
ence of government appointed high officials, who would be under instruc-
tions, but would not be plenipotentiaries with power to bind them. They
would be instructed, whatever disagreements arose, to produce one single
coherent draft Convention. This was agreed, and the U.K., for the first
time, appointed a really senior and effective civil servant as its representa-
tive-Samuel Hoare of the HO. Hoare was instructed that: "we attach great
importance to the text based on our proposals being eventually accepted as
the basis of the Convention."15 The central points in his brief were that he
was to persuade the Conference: "(a) to define the rights... and the limita-
tions with the greatest possible precision, preferably on the basis of the
draft which we had previously submitted, (b) to restrict to States the right
to petition ... (c) to abandon as inappropriate the original proposal ...
that a European Court of Human Rights be established .... -116 There was
continuing disagreement as to how far Hoare ought to go by way of conces-
sion to the Assembly. The FO, but not the CO, was prepared if necessary
to concede a right of individual petition.
15. U.K. PRO CAB 134/403 (IOC(50)41).
16. Id.
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By now both the U.K. and the other member states were anxious to
produce some sort of acceptable Convention. If the Council of Europe,
built around the idea of protecting democracy and human rights, proved to
be incapable of producing a Human Rights Convention, which the Assem-
bly (with only one dissenting vote) had called for, then the very institution
might well collapse entirely, and the Ministers, in particular the British
Minister, would be blamed for the disaster. Hence the Ministers were
inclined to agree to more or less anything that would produce consensus,
and avoid a veto, and at the same time the FO was inclined to try to be as
conciliatory as possible.
The officials were unable to reach a consensus on any of the disputed
matters, but this did not prevent them from producing a single draft,
based, of necessity, upon what the majority supported. It amounted to a
compromise. Over the definition of rights it followed the British model. A
provision on the protection of democratic institutions was not included,
nor was there any provision dealing with the right of property or the right
of parents to choose the kind of education provided for their children, or
indeed to the right to education at all. These exclusions conformed to the
FO view. Again, in accordance with the FO view, there was nothing on
minorities. On enforcement it followed the European Movement's model
with a Commission and a Court. The jurisdiction of the Court was, how-
ever, to be optional. This was a compromise proposed by Sweden. The
Commission would meet in camera, which tended to make its activities less
problematic. The draft also provided for a right of individual petition,
which was opposed only by Britain and Greece. It deferred to British
wishes by including an article permitting derogation in time of war or
emergency, and provided two versions of a colonial applications clause.
The process of weakening the Convention was carried still further, for
there was unanimous agreement not to include the requirement of a formal
declaration at the time of accession (earlier insisted upon by Britain) that
the domestic legislation of member countries gave full effect to the Conven-
tion: "Indeed, it considered it was necessary for the Convention to include
a clause allowing the High Contracting Parties to make reservations with
respect to the maintenance of certain existing laws which might not be in
accordance with a particular provision of the Convention."17 This process
of weakening the Convention made it increasingly acceptable.
In effect, the reference to "high officials" had enabled the FO to secure
a considerable degree of control over the negotiations.
The report of the Conference was made available to Maxwell-Fyfe and
his Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions, which accepted the
compromise on the definition of rights (that is, the U.K. view) and the
optional jurisdiction of the Court. Its main criticism was the omission of
any provision safeguarding democracy, and of the right to property, and to
17. IV COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE TRAVAUX PRtPARATOiRES 216-
17 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1977).
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education. Over the Colonial Clause it favored the more liberal of the two
alternatives proposed.
XIX. The British Cabinet Explosion of I August
The Committee of Ministers was to meet on 3 August, and since agreement
on a text now seemed likely the matter was raised in the British Cabinet on
1 August. A general paper submitted by the FO Minister of State, Kenneth
Younger, urged acceptance of the Covenant in the form that had emerged
from the Conference of Officials. The text was appended. It pointed out
that its provisions, in the main, followed "almost word for word the actual
texts proposed by the United Kingdom representatives."", The Colonial
Secretary drafted a paper urging that the U.K. should, as far as possible,
continue to press for the exclusion of the right of individual petition com-
pletely, and expressing unease over the repercussions of accepting the Con-
vention on the colonies. The Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was already
in Strasbourg and did not attend this meeting.
The general desirability of a European Convention was never previ-
ously fully considered by the Cabinet. The matter had been handled by
officials on the basis that no new general issue of policy was involved and
departments had agreed on all basic issues. There was an explosion from
the Lord Chancellor, William Jowitt, and from Stafford Cripps, the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer. Jowitt thought the Convention was "meaningless
and dangerous," being too loosely drafted and alien to the whole tradition
of the common law. The outcome of this was a decision that Bevin should
be instructed to try to secure that the Committee of Ministers remitted the
draft for further consideration by Governments, and did not submit it for
consideration during the current session of the Consultative Assembly.
After FO attempts to discover what, precisely, the objections of the Cabinet
were it transpired that Cripps was objecting to the draft Article 8 as incom-
patible with economic planning. The other objection was to draft Article
23, which provided for the right of individual petition. Hence at the meet-
ing of the Committee of Ministers on 3 August Bevin indicated that he
would urge the reconsideration of draft Article 23. He declined to object to
Article 8 on the ground that it had no relevance to economic planning and
he did not wish to seem foolish.
He also simply refused to urge delay, aware of the odium this would
bring on the U.K. in Europe. It remains rather obscure what the explosion
was really all about, and the entire event may have been, in reality, an
expression of irritation with Bevin as Foreign Secretary, unconnected with
HR.
After this meeting a subcommittee of government-appointed officials
set about revising the draft produced by the high officials in the light of
proposals from governments. This provided a further opportunity for the
U.K. to secure modifications, and proposals were made (1) to permit trials
18. U.K. PRO CAB 129/41 CP(50) 179.
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in camera, long possible in the U.K., (2) to make the acceptance of the right
of individual petition optional, and (3) to make provision for the denuncia-
tion of the Convention. The U.K. also made it clear that the Colonial Appli-
cations Clause must be modified so as to make it possible for a State which
had extended the Convention to its colonies to withdraw that extension.
Where agreement was possible an agreed draft was produced. Where this
was not possible, as in relation to the Colonial Clause and the right of
individual petition, alternatives were produced.
The Committee of Ministers met again on 7 August and adopted the
British proposal over the Colonial Applications Clause, and a compromise,
acceptable to the U.K., on the right of individual petition. The right
became optional, and could be accepted for a limited period. Only Ireland,
which found the progressive weakening of the Convention in response to
pressure led by the U.K. objectionable, abstained. The Ministers had now
accepted a complete draft, and there was, in practical terms, no way that it
could be substantially altered unless a new full round of negotiations was
to begin. Bevin in effect agreed to the draft, and could not at this late stage
go back on his word. However the Convention was not at this stage signed
(signature has the effect of fixing the text of a treaty, which still has to be
ratified).
XX, The Assembly Seeks to Modify the Text
In order to keep the peace with the Assembly the draft was now submitted
to Maxwell-Fyfe's Committee and to the Assembly. Bevin here did not con-
form to the Cabinet decision, which was to the contrary. The Assembly
made a number of very significant proposals for amendment and voted to
delete the Colonial Clause entirely. Apart from a proposal for a Preamble
these changes were quite unacceptable to the U.K., and there was no
chance of securing immediate agreement to them even if the U.K. had not
objected.
Back in the U.K. the rearguard action byJowitt against the Convention
was maintained. He was, to some degree, now joined by the Attorney Gen-
eral, Sir Hartley Shawcross. The details have been fully explored in an arti-
cle by Geoffrey Marston,19 but the basic reality is that there was never the
least hope of Jowitt, a political lightweight, securing a volte face by Ernest
Bevin and the FO. Bevin was, for all practical purposes, in complete con-
trol of British foreign policy, though he was careful to take steps to carry
the Prime Minister Attlee and the Cabinet along with him. Bevin and the
FO had already committed the U.K.
By the time Jowitt submitted a Cabinet paper he had conceded that the
U.K. was bound to sign the Convention. Arrangements were made to
enable him to save face, and the FO replied to his criticisms in a wholly
unrepentant Cabinet Paper. In effect, this paper was the reply of the offi-
cials to the suggestion that they had in some way behaved improperly in
19. Geoffrey Marston, The United Kingdom's Part in the Preparation of the European
Convention on Human Rights 1950, 42 Ir'L & CoMP. L.Q. 796 (1993).
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 34
the SCIO and WPHR, a suggestion which they resented. The matter came
before the Cabinet again on 24 October, Bevin having explained that the
U.K. must sign the Convention, which Jowitt now conceded. Hence adher-
ence to the Convention was now the agreed policy of the Attlee
government.
Officials representing the Ministers met on 2 November and agreed to
prepare a text for signature by the Ministers, incorporating minor drafting
changes and attempts to ensure that the English and French texts coin-
cided. Ernest Davies signed the text of the Convention on behalf of the
U.K. on 4 November in Rome. Bevin did not attend, probably to avoid
having to attend an audience with the Pope, as all other delegates did, for
Bevin could not bear to be in the same room as a Catholic priest. There
was never any suggestion that it should not be ratified, and Bevin signed
the instrument on 22 February 1951. The officials had previously agreed
that no further reference to the Cabinet was needed.
Of the States involved in the negotiations Belgium ratified in 1955,
Denmark in 1953, West Germany in 1952, Greece in 1953, Iceland in
1953, Ireland in 1953, Italy in 1955, Luxembourg in 1953, the Netherlands
in 1954, Norway in 1952, Sweden in 1952, and Turkey in 1954. The ratifi-
cation by West Germany, as an associate member of the Council of
Europe, was a significant event in the re-integration of Germany into
Europe. France was the chief laggard, not ratifying until 1974. The right
of individual petition was first accepted by Denmark (1953), Germany
(1955), Iceland (1955), Ireland (1953), and Sweden (1952). The U.K. first
accepted it in January 1966 under the then Labour Government. Under
the Colonial Applications Clause the U.K. extended the Convention to
forty-five territories in 1953. The significant exceptions were Hong Kong,
the Sultanate of Brunei (included 1967), the Kingdom of Tonga (included
1964), Zimbabwe, and the South Arabian Emirates. Hong Kong was ini-
tially excluded because the Governor's legal staff was too small to check the
compatibility of local laws. It did not get a Bill of Rights until shortly
before the return to China. Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was effec-
tively self-governing and its government was hostile and under settler influ-
ence. Some of its laws were incompatible. Conditions in the Southern
Arabian Emirates were thought too primitive, some of the provisions (for
example, freedom of religion) would not have been acceptable, and in any
event the area was only weakly controlled, at times by punitive bombing.
Brunei and Tonga were administrative errors.
XXI. The First Protocol
The refusal of the Committee of Ministers to accept the changes recom-
mended by the Consultative Assembly provided yet another bone of con-
tention between the Ministers and the Assembly. The Ministers, anxious to
improve relations, agreed to consider further the possibility of a Protocol
incorporating the rights to property and education, and the guarantee of
democratic institutions. Jowitt and Shawcross now transferred their atten-
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tions to raising problems over the negotiations, which eventually led to the
signature by the incoming Conservative Government of the First Protocol
on 20 March 1952, the day it was opened for signature. The negotiation of
the First Protocol, which was very tedious because of the need to placate
Jowitt and acute difficulties in settling the precise text, is another story.
XXII. Final Comments
During the negotiation of the ECHR the U.K. was, far and away, the most
powerful Western European state, and it still possessed considerable pres-
tige as the home of Human Rights and the savior of European liberty.
Although the Council of Europe formally operated by unanimity, through
the Committee of Ministers, in reality member States were inclined to go
along with the majority and there was reluctance to antagonize the U.K.
The U.K. was in turn anxious not to appear negative in its dealings with the
Council of Europe. The U.K. and France had been largely responsible for
its invention. It was the only Western organization with which West Ger-
many was associated. Bevin did not want to destroy what he had created,
and sought to find something for it to do which would deflect enthusiastic
Europeans from pursuing what he viewed as wild schemes for federation.
Other members of the Council knew that no Convention was possible
unless the U.K. agreed to its terms. When Dowson represented the U.K.
the mice could play, but Hoare was an entirely different proposition. The
French government, though anxious to appease French federalists, was not
in reality very keen on a Convention that would raise problems for France.
Some of the other governments were nervous about an effective Conven-
tion, and much of the pressure for one came from non-governmental
sources. In the event the U.K. entirely dominated the negotiations. The
ECHR (though not the first Protocol) was, for all practical purposes, just
what the FO wanted and represented a compromise accepted reluctantly by
the CO. Provisions unacceptable to the FO became optional (the court and
right of individual petition). Its substantive provision followed U.K. views.
The basic scheme of the arrangements set up the implementation of the
ECHR-state and individual petition, Commission to investigate, screen,
attempt conciliation, and monitor in part access to the Court. This scheme
was eventually accepted by the U.K. and was devised by the European
Movement. Acceptance was motivated by political considerations, the U.K.
being unwilling to become the whipping boy of European integrationists.
The ECHR was conceived as an ideological response to the threat of
Soviet communism, a basic statement of the liberty enjoyed in the free
West. Given the political situation if Europe at the time, it was thought to
be in accordance with British interests to negotiate and ratify the Conven-
tion. It was a purely conservative document, and it was never anticipated
that over the course of the next fifty years its institutions would adopt a
theory of evolutive interpretation that led to the creation of an elaborate
jurisprudence of human rights. The negotiation of the ECHR was con-
ceived to be an aspect of foreign, not domestic, policy. It was not until the
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two Cyprus cases of 1956 and 1957 that it was understood in official cir-
des that the U.K. had committed itself to an institutional scheme of human
rights protection from which it was politically impossible to disengage, and
that this scheme could have serious effects on the activities of government.
The U.K., more or less, won the first of these two cases, subject to powerful
dissent and at the price of abandoning the use of certain emergency pow-
ers. It would probably have substantially won the second torture case, but
perhaps with some egg on its shirt. Life, for the authorities, was never
going to be quite the same again.
